Katsina expands security network with APCs, drones, Community Watch Corps

Katsina State is deploying an unprecedented mix of security hardware, intelligence gathering and community-based interventions as Governor Dikko Radda moves to reshape the state’s response to banditry.

The state now has at least 23 Armored Personnel Carriers, the most acquired by any state government, alongside 200 pickup trucks, hundreds of motorcycles, dozens of drones, surveillance equipment, arms and ammunition, and a world-class surveillance centre.

Much of this equipment has been handed over by the state government to conventional security forces operating in Katsina, including the military and police, as well as the newly established, state-run Community Watch Corps, which is 10,000-strong.

The build-up of security hardware is part of what state officials describe as a multidimensional approach to tackling insecurity, combining equipment, personnel, intelligence and community engagement.

Our correspondents learnt that the purchase of much of the hardware is being supervised by the Government House in Katsina.

According to state officials, closer coordination with the Nigerian Air Force in surveilling, locating and flushing out bandits hiding in forested and rocky areas of some local government areas has been crucial to some of the successes recorded so far.

In August 2025, the Air Force raided a bandit hideout at Pauwa Hill in Kankara LG, rescuing 76 people.

Under Operation Fansan Yamma, the Air Force also destroyed another hideout in Danfako, Faskari LG, in November 2025. Ehimen Ejodame, Director of Public Relations and Information, said the operation followed intelligence gathered through surveillance.

The Air Force similarly destroyed a logistics hub at Dan-Aji Forest in May 2026.

Our correspondents also witnessed surveillance activities that included the deployment of officers of the Nigerian Immigration Service on major highways across the state.

The officers were tasked with monitoring the movement of aliens and communicating with one another in real time.

Katsina is one of several Nigerian states sharing a border with the Niger Republic, making surveillance along its major routes an important component of the state’s security strategy.

The second layer of the strategy involves investment in personnel, training and intelligence gathering within communities, with the aim of preventing banditry by cutting off logistics supplies to criminal elements and creating rapid-response mechanisms when attacks occur.

Central to this approach is the mapping of all 34 local government areas into three categories based on the level of insecurity experienced by their communities.

Dr. Nasir Mu’azu Dan Musa, the Commissioner for Internal Security and Home Affairs, explained the rationale behind the classification of local governments into frontline, vulnerable and crisis-free areas.

He said the categorisation determines the level of deployment of resources, personnel and equipment, as well as the nature of security engagement with communities in each of the 34 LGs.
At least eight LGs are categorised as frontline areas, where bandits are most active.

These areas are generally forested or rocky, providing cover for bandits and making security operations more difficult.

They include Jibia, Batsari, Safana, Dan Musa, Faskari, Sabuwa, Kankara and Sandamu LGs.

Another 11 LGs are classified as vulnerable, while the remaining 15 are regarded as crisis-free.

Dr. Dan Musa said the state government recognises that banditry is community-driven and has, therefore, placed communities at the forefront of its security strategy, before the deployment of conventional forces.

The third layer, which is closely linked to the second, is Governor Radda’s effort to bring traditional rulers, security experts, members of academia, ulemas and community leaders into policy and advisory structures.

The objective is to strengthen coordination and ensure that security interventions are informed by local knowledge and implemented at every level.

These structures include the Security Advisory Committee and a separate Peace Committee in each local government area.

Taken together, the deployment of security hardware, intelligence-led operations, community-based surveillance and the involvement of traditional and community institutions represents a significant shift in Katsina’s approach to insecurity, one that seeks to combine the firepower of conventional security forces with the intelligence and local reach of the communities they are tasked with protecting.

Shuaib Imam